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1. Introduction 
While empirical gravity approaches have been used with great success since the early 1960s, 
the theoretical foundation for this method has been somewhat slower to arrive. Recent 
developments in this respect have driven bilateral gravity specifications towards “structural 
gravity” for explicitly assessing trade cost incidence and various trade costs along with their 
respective impacts on trade and its margins (for overviews, see Anderson, 2011, and Costinot 
and Rodríguez-Clare, 2013). To achieve this, however, structural gravity can only represent a 
subset of theoretical models of specialization and trade that share the property of complete 
specialization in equilibrium (Arkolakis et al., 2012). That selection thus excludes a very 
prominent class of models based on factor proportions theories of trade that need not—and in 
the dominant textbook representation does not—induce complete specialization of production 
and trade.  
Incomplete-specialization versions of factor proportions theories of trade figure more 
prominently in a second strand of the gravity literature that tries to identify different sources 
of trade, connected to various theories of trade (see, e.g., Deardorff, 1998; Feenstra et al., 
2001; Egger, 2002; Evenett and Keller, 2002; Haveman and Hummels, 2004; Kimura et al., 
2007; and Rault et al., 2009). Clearly, this objective requires a gravity formulation more 
general than structural gravity, referred to by Anderson (2011) as “traditional gravity.” But 
exactly because traditional gravity is compatible with many theories of trade, it involves a 
serious “model identification problem” (Evenett and Keller, 2002, p. 782). Our paper is close 
to this second strand of the gravity literature. However, being aware of model identification 
problems and often unsatisfactory attempts at their solution in previous contributions to the 
literature, our objective differs from the previous literature. Rather than attempting to test 
various theories of trade against each other using gravity, in the sense of whether or not they 
explain all trade better than other theories, we take the result of Evenett and Keller (2002) as 
our starting point, that different theories of trade explain different parts of trade. We 
concentrate on one important part of trade: trade in different homogeneous products resulting 
from the incomplete-specialization version of the Heckscher-Ohlin model.1 In that we attempt 
to answer whether differences in factor proportions between pairs of countries are a more 
relevant source of trade for some parts of Europe rather than for others. 
                                            
1 Incidentally, this is the one source of trade that Evenett and Keller (2002) find more support for than for 
trade theories that involve complete specialization as arising from product differentiation or from large 
differences in factor endowments. 
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Our interest in trade patterns among old and new EU members is driven by new 
opportunities for specialization and trade created by the European integration process.  EU 
integration has impacted international trade between old and new EU members even before 
actual enlargement. The association agreements signed in the early 1990s were found to have 
a positive and significant impact on trade flows between transformation and EU countries 
(Caporale et al., 2009; Egger and Larch, 2011). In this respect Egger et al. (2008) show that 
the larger the difference in relative goods and factor prices of two integrating countries before 
integration, the larger the potential overall gains from trade.  
European integration created new opportunities for specialization and trade among old 
and new EU members. We know that an EU-incumbent country was on average capital-
abundant compared to the labor-abundant average accession country (Egger et al., 2008) 
around the time of accession. These supply-side country differences in factor proportions 
should play a role in specialization. One would thus expect old EU members (the EU-15) to 
specialize in capital-intensive final goods. Similarly, the Central and Eastern European 
members that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 (the EU-10) would be expected to specialize in 
labor-intensive final goods. Consequently, it might be promising to analyze final goods trade 
flows across Europe within an incomplete-specialization gravity framework compatible with 
factor proportions theories of trade. 
To identify this part of trade, building mainly on Deardorff (1998), Evenett and Keller 
(2002), and Haveman and Hummels (2004), we motivate a gravity specification that views 
bilateral gravity equations rooted in a Heckscher-Ohlin framework as statistical relationships 
constrained on countries’ multilateral specialization patterns. Our bilateral gravity 
specification includes a time-varying country pair variable to denote the product of two 
countries’ multilateral specialization incentives, as expressed by their respective factor-
proportion differences relative to the rest of the world. As this influence is uniquely rooted in 
the incomplete-specialization version of the Heckscher-Ohlin model, it enables us to identify 
trade in different homogenous goods against all other trade, including trade in variants of 
differentiated goods. Based on this specification, we can show that a class of ad hoc gravity 
equations augmented by absolute supply-side country differences or similarities appears mis-
specified. We then use our specification to answer whether differences in factor proportions 
between pairs of countries are a more relevant source of trade for some parts of Europe rather 
than for others, controlling for other potential sources of trade. We show that, different from 
the average European final goods trade relationship, trade in final goods between Western 
and Eastern Europe is indeed driven by the product of two countries’ multilateral 
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specialization incentives.2 Accordingly, our third result can be read as a corollary: despite the 
gradual catching-up process of new EU members, many of the final goods traded between 
Western and Eastern Europe are still different, rather than differentiated, products. 
In this respect, we are also close to a third, longstanding strand of literature outside 
gravity that combines sector-specific information on factor intensities with country-specific 
information on factor proportions, to test net trade or market-share predictions based on 
factor proportions theories of trade. Recent contributions to this field (Romalis, 2004, 
Bernard et al., 2007, and Chor, 2010) have embedded firm-based models of trade into 
Heckscher-Ohlin frameworks. In fact, our contribution might be seen as a gravity 
complement to these papers, constituting the arguably simplest way of testing for the 
presence of factor-proportion-driven specialization incentives in bilateral gross trade flows, 
because systematic deviation of factor proportions from world averages influences gross 
trade flows. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we discuss structural 
versus traditional gravity, highlighting the roles of trade costs and degrees of specialization 
on gravity specifications. In section 3, we first motivate our gravity specification with 
incomplete specialization. We then develop our empirical model by controlling for 
potentially omitted variables from outside our hypothesized approach, i.e., full trade costs and 
other influences on production and demand sides. Finally, we relate our gravity specification 
to the literature, also elaborating why we see some ad hoc gravity specifications as mis-
specified. In section 4 we describe our data on European trade in final goods. Our estimation 
results are presented in section 5. Conclusions follow in section 6. 
 
2. Trade incentives and trade costs shaping gravity  
We follow Deardorff (1998), Evenett and Keller (2002), and Haveman and Hummels (2004) 
by making two dichotomies our point of departure for deriving bilateral gravity equations: 
complete versus incomplete specialization, and trade incentives versus trade costs.  
 
2.1. Trade incentives without trade costs  
According to Deardorff (1998), four assumptions suffice to build the simplest bilateral 
gravity structure for trade within a world of more than two countries: (i) trade is only in final 
                                            
2 In this paper, the old EU (EU-15) countries are sometimes referred to as “Western Europe”. The new EU 
members that joined the EU in 2004 and later (EU-10) are often referred to as “Eastern Europe”. The detailed 
grouping is given in Appendix Table A.1. 
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goods, (ii) trade is balanced for each country, (iii) each good is consumed in each country 
according to preferences over final goods that are identical worldwide and homothetic, and 
(iv) all trade is frictionless. This illustrates the model identification problem mentioned in the 
introduction, as on the basis of these assumptions we are unable to differentiate between 
sources of trade, as reflected in different theories of trade, with bilateral gravity equations. As 
our approach in section 3 builds on Deardorff (1998), it is worth explaining his argument. For 
this, use nominal values to describe country j’s income, Yj, and consumption and production 
of good k, ܥ௝௞ and ௝ܺ௞, respectively. Due to assumption (iii), ܥ௝௞ ൌ ߣ௞ ௝ܻ, i.e., the consumption 
of good k in country j is a fixed proportion, ߣ௞ , of income, with ∑ ߣ௞௞ ൌ 1. As this also 
holds for the world as a whole, ܥ௪௢௥௟ௗ௞ ൌ ߣ௞ ௪ܻ௢௥௟ௗ, each country’s consumption share of 
good k corresponds to its income share in the world, ݏ௝, and as worldwide consumption of 
each good equals worldwide production, each country consumes each good according to its 
income share, sj,  ܥ௝௞ ൌ ሺ ௝ܻ/ ௪ܻ௢௥௟ௗ)	ܺ௪௢௥௟ௗ௞ ൌ 	 ݏ௝ܺ௪௢௥௟ௗ௞ . Total production in country j, ௝ܺ, is 
described as allocated over final goods according to ௝ܺ௞ ൌ ߜ௝௞ ௝ܺ, ∑ ߜ௝௞௞ ൌ 1. Country-specific 
allocation parameters ߜ௝௞, vary according to details on the production side, to be discussed 
further below. Because we abstract from intermediate production in assumption (i), ௝ܺ ൌ
௝ܻ.	Again, this allocation can be formulated for the world as a whole, ܺ௪௢௥௟ௗ௞ ൌ ߜ௪௢௥௟ௗ௞ ௪ܻ௢௥௟ௗ. 
The net imports of good k into country j from the world are  
ܰܫ௝௪௢௥௟ௗ௞ ൌ ܥ௝௞ െ ௝ܺ௞ ൌ ݏ௝ܺ௪௢௥௟ௗ௞ െ ߜ௝௞ ௝ܻ .    (1) 
Consider theories of trade that yield complete specialization in equilibrium, such as 
Ricardo or monopolistic competition cum economies of scale based on new theories of trade 
(Krugman, 1980): with each good produced in only one country, a country cannot both export 
and import a good, i.e. net imports equal gross imports, ܫ௝௪௢௥௟ௗ௞ . Also, ܺ௪௢௥௟ௗ௞ ൌ ௜ܺ௞, for some 
specific country i, such that all gross exports of good k into country j from the world are in 
fact from country i,  
ܰܫ௝௪௢௥௟ௗ௞ ൌ ܫ௝௜௞ ൌ ݏ௝ ௜ܺ௞ ൌ ݏ௝ߜ௜௞ ௜ܻ . 
Summing over all goods, country j gross imports from country i equal the gross exports of i 
to j, 
ܫ௝௜ ൌ ܧ௜௝ ൌ ∑ ݏ௝ߜ௜௞ ௜ܻ௞ ൌ ݏ௝ߜ௜௞ ௜ܻ ൌ ௒ೕ ௒೔௒ೢ ೚ೝ೗೏.     (2) 
 5 
 
In (2) bilateral gross trade flows between i and j for complete specialization patterns are log-
linear solely in both countries’ incomes and world size.  
It takes an additional statistical argument to get from (1) to (2) when equilibrium 
specialization is incomplete. When, as in a Heckscher-Ohlin framework with factor price 
equalization, homogenous goods are equally priced across countries, it is not possible to 
analytically decompose a country’s worldwide trade into bilateral trade relationships: 
consumers are indifferent to sourcing from any country, including their own, as long as trade 
is costless by assumption (iv). Resolving this indifference by using Deardorff’s (1998) 
random rationing argument, the probability of country j purchasing a unit of k produced in 
any country i equals country i’s share in world output (including country j’s output) of good 
k, such that  
ܫ௝௜௞ ൌ ݏ௝ܺ௪௢௥௟ௗ௞ ௑೔
ೖ
௑ೢ೚ೝ೗೏ೖ
ൌ ݏ௝ߜ௜௞ ௜ܻ . 
Again summing over all goods reproduces equation (2). Although there are possibilities of 
testing different trade theories on the basis of net trade and trade share information, given 
assumptions (i)–(iv), equilibrium patterns of specialization find no reflection in bilateral gross 
trade flows. So gravity is no help in identifying which theory of trade drives the observed 
bilateral trade.  
 
2.2. Trade costs 
Equation (2) is not robust to assumption (iv). Haveman and Hummels (2004) show that in the 
presence of infinitesimally small trade costs patterns of specialization matter for bilateral 
gross trade flows. I.e., the two driving forces of gravity, trade incentives and trade costs, do 
not act independently of each other. However, adding trade costs poses different problems for 
deriving bilateral gravity, depending on whether we address complete or incomplete 
specialization in equilibrium. How can there be incomplete specialization in a Heckscher-
Ohlin framework in the presence of trade costs? Would not infinitesimal trade costs select 
only one supplier of each homogenous good when technologies are the same and when factor 
endowments are similar enough to guarantee factor price equalization? We will go into these 
questions in section 3 of this paper, but clearly this complication does not arise when 
complete equilibrium specialization is guaranteed. Consequently, Arkolakis et al. (2012) note 
that a class of models with CES preferences, one factor of production, linear cost functions, 
complete specialization, and iceberg trade costs generates isomorphic “structural gravity 
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equations”. The right-hand side of equation (2) gets multiplied by a ratio of direct trade costs 
between countries i and j relative to the product of the two indices of all bilateral trade costs 
in the system (see, e.g., equation (5) in Anderson, 2011). These indices represent (inward and 
outward) multilateral resistance, i.e. the intuitively appealing notion that bilateral trade 
barriers should always be measured relative to the world: the higher the trade barriers of a 
country with the world for fixed trade barriers with a specific country, the more the country 
will be driven to trade with this specific country.  
In terms of our four assumptions, to derive structural gravity, trade only in final goods 
remains balanced in this class of models. Assumption (iii) is narrowed down, but most 
importantly assumption (iv) is substituted with assuming the presence of complete 
specialization in equilibrium coupled to one factor of production models.3 Complete 
specialization is so important for analytically deriving gravity because it identifies places of 
production as sources of consumption, establishing bilateral trade relationships by definition. 
Bilateral gravity then becomes an accounting relationship on the production and demand 
sides. In consequence, however, the set of trade theories represented by structural gravity still 
does not cover the dominant textbook version of the incomplete specialization of factor 
proportions theories of trade and is thus too narrow for our purposes of identifying 
incomplete from complete-specialization theories of trade. 
 
2.3. Traditional gravity 
Beyond structural gravity, there is no unique definition of “the gravity equation” in the 
literature. We follow Arkolakis et al. (2012, p. 117) in adopting a broad definition: “a trade 
model satisfies a gravity equation if it predicts that in any cross section, bilateral imports can 
be decomposed into  
 
ln Xij = Ai + Bj + γ ln τij + νij ,     (3) 
 
where Ai is an exporter-specific term; Bj is an importer-specific term; γ is the partial elasticity 
of bilateral imports with respect to variable trade costs; and νij captures country-pair–specific 
parameters that are distinct from variable trade costs (if any).” According to this formulation, 
any further deviations from assumptions (i)–(iv) in section 2.1 beyond those underlying 
structural gravity can be controlled for by adding country or country-pair specific effects, 
                                            
3 Deriving structural gravity is not a problem of market form: it has been shown to hold under perfect 
competition, Bertrand competition, monopolistic competition with homogeneous firms, and more recently under 
monopolistic competition with firm-level heterogeneity. See Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2013). 
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where the final clause in fact reflects the view prevailing in the literature that all deviations 
can be sufficiently captured by country-specific parameters.4 Accordingly, attempts at 
identifying these deviations in a panel context, controlling for all other potential deviations 
with separate time-varying exporter and importer effects, re-opens the model identification 
problem.5  
 In this paper, however, we will concentrate on the “if any” clause above. We do this 
by identifying the interaction of countries’ multilateral specialization incentives—as 
expressed by the product of supply-side country differences relative to the rest of the world—
as a time-varying country-pair influence on gross trade flows within a gravity framework. As 
this influence is unique to factor-proportion influences on trade rooted in the incomplete-
specialization version of the Heckscher-Ohlin model, it enables us to identify this source of 
trade in different homogenous goods against other trade.  
 
3. Gravity specification with incomplete specialization and an application to European 
trade in final goods 
3.1 Trade incentives and trade costs shaping gravity with incomplete specialization 
Formulating a gravity specification from a 2×2×2 framework without trade costs, Evenett and 
Keller (2002) find empirical support for the incomplete-specialization version of Heckscher-
Ohlin. But how can there be incomplete specialization in a Heckscher-Ohlin framework in 
the presence of trade costs? Haveman and Hummels (2004), extending Evenett and Keller 
(2002) by deriving bilateral gravity in a multilateral world, resolve this puzzle by a 
simulation exercise. Adding infinitesimally small, but country-specific transport costs, to 
identical production costs determined by factor price equalization does not change prices but 
it rather changes the cost ordering of suppliers. Hence, there is only one minimum-cost 
supplier country for each good and each customer country. Nevertheless, the result gives rise 
to incomplete specialization in the sense of more than one country in the world producing and 
exporting one particular good to the rest of the world and each supplier country supplying a 
particular good to more than one customer country. 
                                            
4 Cf. Anderson (2011, p. 158): “gravity is about the distribution of given amounts of goods in each origin 
drawn by given amounts of expenditure in each destination, enabling inference about trade costs from the 
deviation of observed distribution from the frictionless equilibrium. The determinants of total shipments and 
total expenditures are irrelevant to this inference because country fixed effects are a consistent control that does 
not require taking a stand on any particular production or market structure model.” 
5 This includes deviations from homothetic, identical demand (see Bergstrand, 1989 and Markusen, 2013), 
incomplete specialization models of trade in homogenous and differentiated goods (Helpman and Krugman, 
1985, chapters 7 and 8), and attempts at embedding heterogenous firm models of trade into Heckscher-Ohlin 
frameworks (Bernard et al., 2007).   
 8 
 
However, we should not add unequal transport costs on top of an identical equilibrium 
production cost. Equilibrium diversification and trade are determined by trade-offs between 
factor endowment and transport-cost influences, so what matters is the minimum of the total 
cost, i.e., the sum of production and trade costs. There can be a minimum total-cost supplier 
to a particular country that is not the minimum production-cost supplier, but is sufficiently 
close in distance to warrant the minimum transportation cost (or the other way around). There 
might arise situations of different suppliers having equal minimum total costs, again evoking 
a rationale for random rationing. 
While there is no full-fledged higher-dimensional Heckscher-Ohlin theory with finite 
trade costs upon which to rest our gravity derivation, the previous paragraph describes how 
we will look at it. We combine Evenett and Keller’s (2002) two-factor Heckscher-Ohlin 
framework with Haveman and Hummels’ (2004) multi-country, multi-product description of 
incomplete specialization. We preserve their setup, in which factor endowments determine 
potential partners and infinitesimal trade costs select partners for trade in homogenous goods. 
We differ, however, in assumptions on geography to better match the European landscape. 
Rather than assuming that countries are ordered like pearls on a thread, we see many small 
countries encircled by other equidistant small countries. For trade, in this set-up, foreign 
distance does not need to matter more than distance at home. In consequence, distance effects 
are of a second order as compared to border effects, even within the EU context. In our 
homogenous-goods case, this means that potentially many countries can be suppliers to 
locations within one country. Assuming infinitesimally small border costs—but no other 
transport costs—in the derivation of incomplete-specialization forces in bilateral gravity 
implies that each customer country is indifferent among all potential supplier countries except 
itself, motivating random rationing à la Deardorff (1998) to decompose countries’ 
multilateral gravity. While assuming infinitesimally small border costs is enough to make 
specialization incentives matter for motivating bilateral gravity, it is accounting for time-
varying exporter- and importer-specific effects in the econometric specification that finally 
introduces the full trade-off between incomplete-specialization forces and distance in bilateral 
gravity equations. In testing this specification, we use sub-sampling to identify which theory 
of trade drives the observed bilateral trade for different trade relationships across Europe. 
 
3.2 Bilateral gravity and incomplete specialization in the presence of infinitesimal trade costs 
As trade is balanced for each country and frictionless beyond border effects, preferences are 
identical and homothetic, and trade is only in final goods, equation (1) from section 2 again 
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holds. Rewriting ܺ௪௢௥௟ௗ௞ ൌ ߜ௪௢௥௟ௗ௞ ௪ܻ௢௥௟ௗ	yields 
ܰܫ௝௪௢௥௟ௗ௞ ൌ ݏ௝ߜ௪௢௥௟ௗ௞ ௪ܻ௢௥௟ௗ െ ߜ௝௞ ௝ܻ       
ൌ ௝ܻ ሺߜ௪௢௥௟ௗ௞ െ ߜ௝௞ሻ.    (1a) 
Summing over all goods and selecting export items with positive exports into the set SEj, 
Haveman and Hummels (2004) derive country j’s multilateral exports (Ej) as log-linear in 
income and a specialization pattern relative to the world average ሺߜ௝௞ െ ߜ௪௢௥௟ௗ௞ ሻ, 
ܧ௝௪௢௥௟ௗ ൌ ௝ܻ ∑ ሺߜ௝௞ െ ߜ௪௢௥௟ௗ௞ ሻ௞∈ௌಶೕ .    (3) 
From section 2.1, the specialization pattern describes the difference between the value-added 
of final goods production in country j and the world average. Analogously, we derive a 
specification for imports: 
 ܫ௝௪௢௥௟ௗ ൌ ௝ܻ ∑ ሺߜ௪௢௥௟ௗ௞ െ ߜ௝௞ሻ௞∈ௌ಺ೕ .
6    (4) 
Were complete specialization to hold in equilibrium, it would again be easy to show 
that the decomposition in section 2.1 again holds such that bilateral trade depends on partner 
incomes and world size, and nothing else. With incomplete specialization and no further costs 
of trade considered, however, it is not possible to analytically decompose (3) and (4) into 
bilateral trade relationships for a world with more than two countries. However, bilateral 
trade relationships will be distributed in a statistical sense across a sample of countries, as (3) 
and (4) must be met on the average of all bilateral trading relationships for each country. In 
consequence, in a sample of heterogeneous countries, larger countries and/or countries with 
higher degrees of multilateral specialization can be expected to trade more with each other, 
provided their specializations are complementary to each other. To clarify this, we again 
make use of Deardorff’s (1998) random choice argument, which in our context states that a 
country’s consumers, due to small border effects, prefer their home product to foreign 
products, but are indifferent between foreign produced products. Hence, good k imports of 
country i from country j are given by country i’s worldwide imports of good k times country 
j’s share in worldwide exports of k: 
                                            
6 In principle, this method can be adapted to motivate trade in intermediate goods resulting from the horizontal 
or vertical fragmentation of production. See Frensch et al. (2012). 
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ܫ௜௝௞ ൌ ܫ௜௪௢௥௟ௗ௞
ܧ௝௪௢௥௟ௗ௞
∑ ܧ௝௪௢௥௟ௗ௞௝  
ൌ ௜ܻ൫ߜ௪௢௥௟ௗ௞ െ ߜ௜௞൯ ௝ܻ
൫ߜ௝௞ െ ߜ௪௞൯
∑ ܧ௝௪௢௥௟ௗ௞௝  
ൌ ௒ೕ௒೔∑ ாೕೢ೚ೝ೗೏ೖೕ ൫ߜ௝
௞ െ ߜ௪௢௥௟ௗ௞ ൯൫ߜ௪௢௥௟ௗ௞ െ ߜ௜௞൯   (5) 
The incentives driving countries’ bilateral trade under incomplete specialization must match 
the underlying Heckscher-Ohlin framework. Consider again that the worldwide exports of 
some good k’ from country j are given by ܧ௝௪௢௥௟ௗ௞’ ൌ ௝ܻሺߜ௝௞’ െ ߜ௪௢௥௟ௗ௞’ ሻ. We can reduce the 
dimensionality of our problem by understanding this multilateral gravity equation as a 
bilateral gravity equation between country j and world. Then, using the argument put forward 
in Evenett and Keller (2002, p. 286), in a 2×2×2 Heckscher-Ohlin world, if country j is 
relatively capital rich and good k is capital intensive, value-added ߜ௝௞’ is positively related to 
country j’s capital-labor ratio κj = (K/L)j and value-added ߜ௪௢௥௟ௗ௞’  is inversely related to 
world’s capital-labor ratio κworld = (K/L)world. Then, the volume of trade increases with the 
difference between capital-labor ratios, (κj – κworld), such that ܧ௝௪௢௥௟ௗ௞’ ∝ ௝ܻሺߢ௝ െ ߢ௪௢௥௟ௗሻ. 
Analogously, we can write ܫ௜௪௢௥௟ௗ௞’ ∝ ௜ܻሺߢ௪௢௥௟ௗ െ ߢ௜ ሻ for relatively labor-rich country i 
importing the capital-intensive good k’. Accordingly, with equation (5), for any two countries 
j and i that are, respectively, capital rich and labor rich relative to the world, good k’ imports 
of country i from country j are  
ܫ௜௝௞’ ∝ ௜ܻ ௝ܻ൫ߢ௝ െ ߢ௪ ൯൫ߢ௪ െ ߢ௜ ൯,    (6) 
as ∑ ܧ௝௪௢௥௟ௗ௞’௝  is given for each particular country. According to Ethier (1984), the Heckscher-
Ohlin theorem carries through to the case of more than two goods, such that specialization 
patterns between j and world and world and i continue to be shaped by differences in capital-
labor ratios in terms of correlations. We can therefore generalize proportionality (6) to the 
multi-product case, to describe the total expected imports of capital intensive goods to labor-
rich i from capital-rich j, 
ܧ௝௜ ൌ ܫ௜௝ ∝ ௜ܻ ௝ܻ൫ߢ௝ െ ߢ௪௢௥௟ௗ൯൫ߢ௪௢௥௟ௗ െ ߢ௜ ൯.   (7) 
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As country j is relatively capital-rich and i is relatively labor-rich, j exports only capital-
intensive goods and i exports only labor-intensive goods such that proportionality (7) in fact 
holds for the total expected trade between j and i. 
Deardorff (1979) shows that, in a two-country, two-factor model, trade in more than 
two goods still accords with the ranking of goods by factor intensity if there are unequal 
factor prices, as is possible here due to border costs. Accordingly, if j is capital-richer than 
world, j will export the more capital-intensive goods and its wage-rental ratio will be higher 
than that for world. Thus, the predictive power of ௝ܻ൫ߢ௝ െ ߢ௪௢௥௟ௗ൯	for exports in capital-
intensive goods from j to world continues to hold for ௝ܻ൫ݓ௝ െ ݓ௪௢௥௟ௗ൯, where wj and wworld 
represent supply-side characteristics either in the form of capital-labor or wage-rental ratios. 
As the analogous reasoning can be applied to labor-rich country-i imports of capital intensive 
goods from world, we can generalize proportionality (7) accordingly, such that bilateral trade 
is driven by countries’ multilateral specialization incentives, as expressed by the product of 
supply-side country differences relative to the rest of the world, with or without factor price 
equalization, 
ܧ௝௜ ൌ ܫ௜௝ ∝ ௜ܻ ௝ܻ൫ݓ௝ െ ݓ௪௢௥௟ௗ൯൫ݓ௪௢௥௟ௗ െ ݓ௜൯.   (8) 
 
3.3 European trade in final goods: empirical specification 
As indicated in the introduction, we do not want to test how well equation (8) explains total 
trade. Rather, we want to test whether incomplete-specialization forces are a more or less 
important source of trade across different bilateral trade relationships within Europe. 
Although on average Western European countries are relatively capital-richer than Eastern 
European economies, they are not identical groupings. Consequently, we cannot for our 
purposes define subsamples of capital-rich versus capital-poor counties, let alone the 
problems with measurement. We therefore reformulate (8) in absolute values, such that for 
any pair in our sample of heterogeneous European countries, the basis for our econometric 
specification of total bilateral trade in final goods is the log-linear relationship 
log 	ܧ௝௜ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ߚଵ log൫ ௝ܻ ൈ ௜ܻ൯ ൅ ߚଶ log൫หݓ௝	–	ݓ௪௢௥௟ௗห ൈ หݓ௜	–	ݓ௪௢௥௟ௗห൯.  (9) 
Equation (9) modifies Haveman and Hummels’ (2004) approach to formulate bilateral 
gravity equations in the presence of incomplete specialization as statistical relationships 
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constrained on countries’ multilateral specialization patterns, with respect to both partner 
incomes and specialization patterns. Equation (9) is easy to interpret: assuming a sample of 
heterogeneous countries, bilateral trade volumes will increase with the product of trading 
countries’ incomes (Yj×Yi) and with the countries’ degree of specialization against the world 
average. Specifically, bilateral trade volumes are expected to increase with the product of 
countries’ respective supply-side differences against the world, หݓ௝	–	ݓ௪௢௥௟ௗห ൈ
หݓ௜	–	ݓ௪௢௥௟ௗห. Hence, specification (9) captures the fact that bilateral trade flows will 
increase with relative, rather than absolute, supply-side country differences.  
However, despite being simple and directly related to equation (8), specification (9) is 
incomplete. The reason is that relative supply-side country differences in (9) now predict 
large trade volumes also for countries that lack complementary specialization. To account for 
this problem, we let the data reveal specialization patterns, i.e., we select relative supply-side 
country differences for particular bilateral trade relationships by assigning dummy variables. 
Our prior expectation for specialization has already been outlined above: we expect the old 
EU members (EU-15) to specialize in capital-intensive goods on average, and the Eastern 
European new members that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 (EU-10) are expected to 
specialize in labor-intensive goods on average. Hence, by letting the data speak for itself, we 
first assign the dummy variable DummyEU15/10 to equal one for trade flows between old 
(EU-15) and new (EU-10) EU countries, and zero otherwise. Second, we create a combined 
dummy variable (ܦݑ݉݉ݕܧܷ15/10௝௜ log൫หݓ௝,௧	–	ݓ௪௢௥௟ௗ,௧ห ൈ หݓ௜,௧	–	ݓ௪௢௥௟ௗ,௧ห൯) to detect 
specialization patterns between EU-15 and EU-10 countries that are a priori expected to be 
complementary on average. 
Further, given the progress in the integration process between both groups of 
countries (EU-15 and EU-10), we expect that the pattern will show a dynamic development 
that represents technological progress through decreasing trade costs. Technological progress 
is exogenous to our model and can be represented by time effects. Our motivation of trade 
implies complementarity between technological progress and the possibility of using supply-
side country differences. Hence, we model this by interacting the combined variable 
ܦݑ݉݉ݕܧܷ15/10௝௜,௦ log൫หݓ௝,௧	–	ݓ௪௢௥௟ௗ,௧ห ൈ หݓ௜,௧	–	ݓ௪௢௥௟ௗ,௧ห൯ with time-period effects and 
for this purpose we divide the sample period (1992–2008) into five sub-periods (s) of 
(almost) equal length. The division of the time span into several periods reflects: (i) the 
different stages of economic transition in the CEE countries (from the early 1990s to the 
middle 2000s), (ii) the preparations for EU accession (1995–2004) with the relevant effects 
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on bilateral trade and aggregate output (Egger and Larch, 2011), (iii) the post-accession 
period, and (iv) changes in manufacturing patterns related to FDI (Hanousek et al., 2011). 
Thus, bilateral trade in final goods (Eji,t) can finally be described by the following 
specification: 
 
log 	ܧ௝௜,௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ߚଵ log൫ ௝ܻ,௧ ൈ ௜ܻ,௧൯ ൅ ߚଶ log൫หݓ௝,௧	–	ݓ௪௢௥௟ௗ,௧ห ൈ หݓ௜,௧	–	ݓ௪௢௥௟ௗ,௧ห൯ 
൅෍ߛ௦ܦݑ݉݉ݕሺܧܷ15 10⁄ ሻ௝௜,௦ log൫หݓ௝,௧	–	ݓ௪௢௥௟ௗ,௧ห ൈ หݓ௜,௧	–	ݓ௪௢௥௟ௗ,௧ห൯
ହ
௦ୀଵ
൅	 ௝ߴ௜,௧ ൅	ߝ௜௝,௧	 
           (10a) 
where 
 ௝ߴ௜,௧ ൌ 	 ௝ܿ௜ ൅ ݇௧ ൅ ߩ௝,௧ ൅ ߮௜,௧.       (10b) 
 
In specification (10a) the dummy variable DummyEU15/10 equals one for trade relationships 
between EU-15 and EU-10 countries as defined above, and zero otherwise. Then, ߝ௜௝,௧ is the 
error term, and ௝ߴ௜,௧ contains various factors influencing trade relationships described in 
literature; these are detailed in the specification (10b). In particular, coefficients kt are 
dummies for years and they typically capture unobserved technological progress and price 
development. Country-pair fixed effects ௝ܿ௜ control for time-invariant trade factors. Time-
varying exporter and importer effects (ߩ௝,௧ and ߮௜,௧) are usually included when country-pairs 
fixed effects ௝ܿ௜ are replaced by a parsimonious specification concerning only importers and 
exporters fixed effects (Anderson, 2011). Together with country-pair fixed effects they 
control for countries’ multilateral trade resistance (Baldwin and Taglioni, 2006). 
However, including all factors listed in (10b) would lead to an identification problem 
in the estimation stage, or at least to a weak identification of the model because of excessive 
number of parameters. We solve this dilemma by adopting the following specification of 
௝ߴ௜,௧: 
௝ߴ௜,௧ ൌ 	 ௝ܿ௜ ൅ ݇௧.        (10c) 
The reason is following. During the estimation stage (see Section 5) we also control for 
potential endogeneity. This is done by running dynamic panel estimation, which is conducted 
on the first differences of (10a). At the same time we also control for dynamic exporter and 
importer effects by employing the relevant auxiliary parameters during dynamic panel 
estimation. Consequently, (10a) is able to control for sources of trade other than the 
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incomplete-specialization version of the Heckscher-Ohlin model, in which the product of two 
countries’ multilateral specialization incentives is expressed by their respective factor 
proportions differences relative to the rest of the world. First, complete-specialization trade is 
identified as the limiting case for which the influence of the product of supply-side country 
differences relative to the rest of the world is zero.7 Second, following Anderson (2011), all 
other potential sources of trade are controlled for by time-varying exporter importer effects 
during dynamic panel estimation (see section 5), as argued in section 2.3. 
The theoretical background behind our specification rests in incomplete-specialization 
models such as Heckscher-Ohlin and, therefore, incentives for incomplete specialization and 
trade are supply-side country differences in factor endowments, relative to the world average. 
In the presence of factor price equalization, relevant factor endowments like capital-labor 
ratios can be proxied by average GDP per capita. Factor price equalization may break down, 
as argued above. Further, in terms of empirical work, using GDP per capita might create a 
problem at the estimation stage due to potential correlation with the dependent trade flow 
variable. Hence, we employ in our benchmark regression data on wages in pairs of exporting 
(wj) and importing (wi) European countries to capture supply-side country differences in 
wage-rental ratios, assuming much lower variation in interest rates than in wages across 
Europe. For robustness purposes GDP per capita will be used as an alternative measure of 
supply-side country differences. 
 
3.4 Relations to the literature  
In the previous sections, we relied on Haveman and Hummels (2004) to extend the two-
country world of Evenett and Keller (2002) to a multilateral setting. At the same time, we 
modified Haveman and Hummels (2004) with respect to how geography works in a 
multilateral Heckscher-Ohlin world, to allow for random rationing á la Deardorff (1998) 
rather than selecting one minimum cost supplier per destination country. This specified 
Haveman and Hummels’ (2004) point that bilateral gravity equations in the presence of 
incomplete specialization are statistical relationships to the statement that bilateral trade is 
driven by countries’ multilateral specialization incentives, as expressed by supply-side 
country differences relative to the rest of the world. Different from our argument between 
equations (3) and (4) and equation (7) in the previous section, Haveman and Hummels (2004) 
                                            
7 While in principle this may include the complete-specialization version of Heckscher-Ohlin, results in 
Debaere and Demiroglu (2003) rule this out, as factor proportions differences across Europe are simply too 
small. 
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ad hoc proxy specialization patterns by specialization incentives in terms of separate partner 
countries’ capital-labor ratios, κj = (K/L)j, relative to world averages.8 As our specification 
(10a) singles out a time-varying country-pair influence unique to the incomplete-
specialization version of the Heckscher-Ohlin model, it enables us to control for all other 
trade influences, in the form of separate time-varying exporter and importer effects during the 
dynamic panel estimation (see section 5), as recommended in Anderson (2011), including the 
specification of Haveman and Hummels (2004). 
In the introduction we stated the objective of this paper in terms of testing whether 
differences in factor proportions between pairs of countries are a more relevant source of 
trade for some parts of Europe than for others, rather than attempting to test various theories 
of trade against each other using gravity. Other contributions to the literature have done the 
latter using bilateral gravity equations augmented by ad hoc measures of supply-side country 
differences, such as absolute values of differences in per capita incomes or wages between 
exporter and importer countries, rather than expressing supply-side country differences 
relative to the rest of the world. The idea of such an approach is to formulate prior 
expectations on the coefficient for per capita income differences according to alternative 
trade theories. On the one hand, trade driven by comparative advantages based on factor 
proportions would imply a positive coefficient for the per capita income gap. On the other 
hand, the existence of horizontal intra-industry trade driven by new trade theories à la 
Krugman (1980) could be taken to imply a negative coefficient for the per capita income 
gap.9 However, testing the influences of various trade theories against each other within one 
and the same gravity specification assumes that these theories can be reduced to the same 
gravity specification. On the basis of the sections above, we argue that gravity equations 
augmented by ad hoc absolute supply-side country differences are mis-specified since 
describing trade flows as log-linear in both country sizes and absolute country income 
differentials does not describe the data well, neither against complete- nor incomplete-
specialization models of production and trade. 
                                            
8 The basis for their econometric specification of bilateral trade is log 	ܧ௝௜ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ߚଵ log൫ ௝ܻ ൈ ௜ܻ൯ ൅
ߚଶ൫หߢ௝	–	ߢ௪௢௥௟ௗห ൅ ߚଷหߢ௜	–	ߢ௪௢௥௟ௗห൯. Testing for Heckscher-Ohlin sources of specialization patterns based on 
this specification in a panel context and controlling for all other potential deviations with separate time-varying 
exporter and importer effects obviously results in the model identification problem caveat of section 2.3. 
9 Rault et al. (2009, p. 1551): “Concerning the sign of the difference of GDP per capita, it is positive if the 
Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) assumptions are confirmed. On the contrary, according to the new trade theory, the 
income per capita variable between countries is expected to have a negative impact.” In the same spirit, see also 
Egger (2002) and Kimura et al. (2007).  
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Rather, our view of bilateral gravity equations rooted in a Heckscher-Ohlin 
framework as statistical relationships constrained on countries’ multilateral specialization 
patterns can be related to the treatment of multilateral resistance in recent gravity literature 
(Anderson, 2011). It is in fact intuitively appealing to measure both trade incentives rooted in 
supply-side country differences as trade as well as bilateral trade barriers relative to the 
world.  
Finally, as noted in the introduction, our contribution is also close to papers outside 
gravity that combine sector-specific information on factor intensities with country-specific 
information on factor proportions. Especially, our contribution may be seen as a gravity 
complement to Romalis (2004), who combines Krugman (1980) with the two-country, two-
factor, and many goods model in Dornbusch et al. (1980) into a many-country, many-goods 
and two-factor model with finite border costs, with the prediction that countries capture larger 
market shares in industries that use their abundant factor more intensively. In terms of 
tackling the multidimensionality problems of Heckscher-Ohlin trade, Romalis (2004) also 
reduces the problem by assuming only two types of countries, northern and southern, and 
then accounting for the separate roles of border costs and product differentiation in 
generating his results: border costs without product differentiation define countries’ total 
trade, but in terms of bilateral trade only delimit country pairs that may trade with each other, 
very much like our equation (7) implies the result that there is zero trade among capital-rich 
or among labor-rich countries.  
 
4. Data 
Final goods exports from country j to i, (Eji), from 1992 to 2008 are obtained from the UN 
COMTRADE database. The definition of final goods follows the BEC categorization of UN 
Statistics.10 All our trade data are reported according to the Standard International Trade 
Classification, Revision 3 (SITC, Rev.3). Data are used at all aggregation levels. For our 
analysis we use bilateral trade data for the set of countries listed in Appendix Table A.1. We 
consider all bilateral trades in which at least one (either exporter or importer, or both) is an 
EU country (EU-15 or EU-10). Thus, for each year we observe hundreds of bilateral trade 
data points. Specifically we observe a total of 29 ൈ 28 = 812 bilateral trade relationships in 
                                            
10 United Nations Statistics Division, Methods and Classifications: Classification by Broad Economic 
Categories, defined in terms of SITC, Rev.3 (BEC Rev.3). Available online at 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/class/family/family2.asp?Cl=10. 
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Europe alone, a part of which are between Western (EU-15) and Eastern (EU-10) European 
economies. 
For our first and key trade flow measure we employ 1-digit-level aggregate trade 
flows. Then we use all entries at the 4- and 5-digit levels to distinguish and count SITC 
categories for the definition of extensive versus intensive margins of trade flows as in 
Frensch (2010). Hence, our second measure, trade along the extensive margin, represents the 
variety of final goods exported from country j to country i. It is defined as a count measure 
over 1,147 final goods (702 capital goods, 445 consumer goods) out of all 5,368 of the SITC 
Rev.3 categories. Our third measure, along the intensive margin, represents the depth of the 
trade in the final goods exported from country j to country i. The intensive margin is defined 
as the average volumes of the exported final goods categories. 
Exporter (Yj) and importer GDP (Yi ) at current prices are obtained from World 
Development Indicators, accessed via the DCI database. 
Our direct measure for forming relative supply-side country differences are wages, 
measured as annual wage averages in the manufacturing sector of the exporting or importing 
country (wj and wi, respectively). The data were obtained from LABORSTA (International 
Labour Office statistical databases (http://laborsta.ilo.org/). As an alternative measure of the 
supply-side country differences we employ exporter and importer GDP per capita at current 
prices obtained from World Development Indicators. To construct relative supply-side 
country differences, หݓ௝	–	ݓ௪௢௥௟ௗห ൈ หݓ௜	–	ݓ௪௢௥௟ௗห, world GDP per capita at current prices 
and world average wage (wworld) are measured as mean GDP per capita in the world and the 
mean wage in the world, respectively. The world is defined by our full reporting sample of 
countries described in Appendix Table A.1. Following Debaere (2003) we also construct 
weighted averages of world GDP per capita and wages, in which population sizes (pi), 
obtained from the World Development Indicators serve as weights. The weighted averages 
are used in our estimation as they account for differences in country sizes; more discussion is 
offered in section 6. Time-specific effects in specification (10a) and (10c) also control for 
each year’s data using a different numéraire since GDP and trade values are all current 
(Baldwin and Taglioni, 2006), where the original U.S.-dollar-denominated data are converted 
to euros. 
As outlined in the introduction, our interest in trade patterns among old and new EU 
members is driven by the new opportunities for specialization and trade created by European 
integration. Although new EU members were accepted in 2004 and 2007, they had already 
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removed trade barriers before and during the accession process (Egger and Larch, 2011). 
Hence, we analyze a set of countries that impose no barriers on trade among themselves and 
for this reason the data are not contaminated by differences in tax/tariff regimes or customs 
rules. 
 
5. Estimation  
We estimate specification (10a) and (10c) on unbalanced panel data with a mean length of 
time dimension of about 10 years.11 In order to obtain consistent estimates we employ a 
dynamic panel-data model following Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), 
Blundell and Bond (1998), and Blundell, Bond, and Windmeijer (2000). The estimator is 
implemented in STATA 12 as the command xtdpd and it uses moment conditions in which 
lagged levels of the dependent and predetermined variables serve as instruments for the 
differenced equation.12  
We begin our estimation by performing a Hausman-type specification test to assess 
the potential endogeneity of the explanatory variables by comparing a standard fixed effects 
model with the Arellano-Bond-Bover-Blundell (ABBB) technique. The test confirms the 
endogeneity of the explanatory variables. Therefore, we proceed with instrumentation. 
Technically, we estimate the theoretically motivated specification (10a) in a panel 
setting with fixed effects plus instrumental variables to overcome problems of omitting 
variable bias and to control for time-invariant endogeneity and selection bias. This is done 
because some of the right-hand-side variables are correlated with the dependent variable. 
Specifically, given that specification (10a) is rooted in models of incomplete specialization 
and trade such as Heckscher-Ohlin, existing wage differences may be subject to factor price 
equalization tendencies by the very trade they induce. We follow Arellano and Bond (1991) 
and apply the simplest possible remedy in choosing the second lags of the explanatory 
variables as instruments. Further, let us note that GDP by standard identities contains 
corrections for international trade flows and therefore using a GDP measure, either in 
absolute values or scaled per capita values, would create problems even in a panel setting. 
The reason is that, by construction, the unobserved panel-level effects are correlated with 
potentially endogenous independent variables that cause standard estimators to be 
                                            
11 One drawback to using panel data lies in the potential non-stationarity of trade and income data, likely 
implying biased estimates with fixed effects models. However, since the mean time length of our panel is about 
10 years, the unit root is not a real issue. 
12 As we do not encounter any zero trade flows, there is no need for a two-step procedure, such as in Helpman et 
al. (2008). 
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inconsistent. Our estimation approach controls for the potential endogeneity of explanatory 
variables and performs well even with low-order moving average correlations in error terms 
or predetermined variables as in Blundell and Bond (1998). Finally, the ABBB technique, as 
employed, accounts for time-varying exporter and importer behavior and it does so more 
efficiently than panel OLS with time-varying effects.13 
Since bilateral trade volume will increase with the product of trading countries’ 
incomes, we expect that β1 > 0. As equations (3) and (4) describe the expected values of 
bilateral trade relationships, we may even expect β1 to equal one, provided the extent of 
specialization is uncorrelated with income. We cannot form an unambiguous a priori 
expectation of β2 without further information on the sample of countries. If the sample is 
heterogeneous in terms of complementary specialization, we expect β2 > 0. On the other 
hand, if the sample is sufficiently homogenous, with say all wi > wworld, then there is no 
reason to assume the majority of country pairs to be complementarily specialized. In this 
case, the higher extent of countries’ respective supply-side differences against the world 
(หݓ௝	–	ݓ௪௢௥௟ௗห ൈ หݓ௜	–	ݓ௪௢௥௟ௗห) will even generate less trade, as both countries together 
move away from the world average and we may expect β2 < 0. Finally, if the combined 
dummy variable (ܦݑ݉݉ݕܧܷ15/10௝௜ log൫หݓ௝,௧	–	ݓ௪௢௥௟ௗ,௧ห ൈ หݓ௜,௧	–	ݓ௪௢௥௟ௗ,௧ห൯) for a 
specific period (s) selects from the data country pairs exhibiting complementary 
specialization, we expect γs > 0. Of course, for the limiting case of complete specialization, 
we would not find incomplete-specialization incentives playing any role, in which case β2 = 
γs = 0. 
As already argued above, complete specialization is in principle compatible with both 
monopolistic competition models of trade and Heckscher-Ohlin. Evenett and Keller (2002) 
discriminate between the two on the basis of the presence of intra-industry trade, assuming 
that all observed intra-industry trade is solely accounted for by monopolistic competition 
models of trade. We have reservations about this identification, given the literature pointing 
to Heckscher-Ohlin forces yielding different forms of intra-industry trade (see, e.g., Davis, 
1995). Since Debaere and Demiroglu (2003) find evidence of similar factor endowments 
among many countries of our sample, we rather argue that these endowments potentially 
enable them to produce the same set of goods. On this basis, we will identify our limiting 
                                            
13 The ABBB technique is a dynamic panel estimation that is a structural form estimation and controls for 
endogeneity. The way the estimation method is constructed assumes that the country fixed effects are not 
necessarily constant over time. The time-varying effects of exporter-importer country pairs are already 
controlled for by the technical implementation. Note that these parameters are considered auxiliary and they are 
not estimated by the main model. 
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case of β2 = γs = 0 as complete specialization based on monopolistic competition models of 
trade, indicating trade in differentiated rather than different products.  
 
6. Empirical results 
We introduce our benchmark results for trade flows in final goods from, to, and across 
Europe based on specification (10a) in Tables 1 and 2. Each table contains estimates for a 
specific variable employed to measure supply-side country differences based on weighted 
world averages. Table 1 shows the estimates when supply-side country differences are 
proxied by wages, while Table 2 shows estimates when GDP per capita is employed. 
Statistically significant and large coefficients β1 for both measures demonstrate that larger 
countries indeed trade more final goods with each other.  
The average specialization effect of relative supply-side country differences on final 
goods trade flows is captured by coefficients β2. No matter what measure of the relative 
supply-side country differences is used, coefficients β2 are negative and relatively small (-
0.096 in Table 1 and -0.078 in Table 2). This finding confirms that specialization incentives 
compatible with theories of incomplete specialization and trade do not play much of a role for 
final goods trade in our sample of European countries. Rather, the average European trade 
relationship in final goods appears to be represented by a simple gravity specification, “as if” 
driven by factors compatible with complete-specialization theories, such as economies of 
scale and product differentiation.  
The average pattern, captured by coefficients β2, however, does not fully reveal the 
role of specialization incentives in old and new EU members. This becomes evident when we 
compare the coefficients β2 with the always significantly positive and larger coefficients γs. 
The sum of the coefficient pairs β2 and γs is computed for each period separately: β2 + γ1 for 
the first period 1992–1995, β2 + γ2 for the second period 1996–1998, etc. For each period the 
sum of the coefficient pairs β2 and γs is positive and statistically significant. This fact 
indicates that relative supply-side country differences do drive final goods trade between the 
original EU-15 and ten new EU countries (EU-10), rather than within each of the two country 
groups or across the average of all European trade relationships. Specifically, when 
measuring relative supply-side country differences by wages (Table 1), final goods trade 
flows between old and new EU members react with an elasticity between 4 and about 7%. 
Measuring relative supply-side country differences by per capita GDP (Table 2) lowers both 
elasticities to a range between 0% and 5%. In both cases elasticities rise gradually during the 
first three periods (1992–2001) and subsequently decrease during last two periods (2002–
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2008). This pattern might be credited to the fact that already in the early years of the 
economic transformation, and still before accession, would-be new EU members rapidly 
reoriented their international trade relationships towards EU countries. Increasing coefficients 
provide evidence that both old and would-be new EU countries have reaped the benefits of 
the relatively large supply-side country differences. At a later stage, shortly before and 
following accession, new EU members progressed in their economic convergence process 
and their differences with respect to the old EU members began to decrease. This process is 
reflected in declining coefficients during 2002–2008. However, despite the variation in the 
sum of the coefficient pairs β2 and γs in different periods, we show that bilateral trade flows 
between old and new EU members appear to be driven by incomplete-specialization motives. 
We complement our results by a robustness check and perform a statistical 
comparison of the coefficients derived from the estimated specification (10a) where wages 
and GDP per capita serve as a measure for supply-side country differences. We compare the 
coefficients presented in Table 1 (wages) and Table 2 (GDP per capita). In Figure 1 we 
present the plots of the confidence intervals of the above coefficients. Dark and blank bars 
depict wages-based and GDP-based coefficients, respectively. The shapes of the dark bars 
exhibit wider intervals due to the greater variability of wages. There is a clear overlap of the 
confidence intervals of coefficients β1 and β2. For the coefficients associated with multiples 
of countries’ incomes (β1), this finding comes as no surprise since the identical measures are 
used in estimation. The overlap of the confidence intervals of coefficients associated with the 
average specialization effect (β2) means that the results are in a statistical sense robust to 
either of the two measures of supply-side country differences. However, there is no overlap 
for coefficients associated with complementary specialization effects (γs). Coefficients are 
lower when per capita GDP is used and this proxy underestimates the effect of the supply-
side country differences in measuring complementary specialization effects. Hence, the 
robustness check supports the choice of wages as adequate measure of the supply-side 
country differences. 
In the next step we further enrich our results by decomposing our analysis of the trade 
in final goods into its two key components: capital and consumer goods. The results are 
presented in two tables in the Appendix: Table A.2 (capital goods) and Table A.3 (consumer 
goods). In each table we present estimates when supply-side country differences are proxied 
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by wages.14 Our findings are in line with those of the aggregate final goods: trade increases 
with countries’ incomes (large and positive coefficients β1), the average incomplete-
specialization effect of relative supply-side country differences does not seem to contribute to 
trade (small, negative coefficients β2), and relative supply-side country differences (sum of β2 
and γs) are drivers of trade in capital and consumer goods between the old and new members 
of the EU. However, we find distinctive differences in the effects of both types of final good. 
The effect of the countries’ incomes (β1) is by about one-fifth stronger for capital goods. The 
average incomplete-specialization effect (β2) is more balanced for both goods. The key 
differences are found in the effect of specialization patterns in trade between the EU-15 and 
EU-10. Technical progress in terms of declining trade costs, as captured by the sub-period 
dummies’ coefficients (γs), appears to positively influence both types of final-good trade for 
EU-15/EU-10 pairs. The dynamics of this influence is different, though. In case of capital 
goods, coefficients γs increase over time until the EU accession and then decrease. For 
consumer goods, coefficients γs gradually decrease during the whole period under research. 
Consistently larger sums of the coefficient pairs β2 and γs in Table A.3 show that the role for 
incomplete-specialization incentives across Europe is more robust for consumer goods than 
for capital goods (Table A.2). Specifically, capital goods trade flows between Eastern and 
Western Europe react with an elasticity growing from about 2 to about 6% (Table A.2). 
Consumer goods trade flows (Table A.3) exhibit a much stronger reaction: elasticity begins at 
about 16% and gradually declines to about 7%. Consequently, bilateral capital goods trade 
flows between old and new EU members appear to be driven by incomplete-specialization 
motives, and this is even more clear for consumer goods trade.  
In the above account we have shown that European trade in final goods on average 
appears as if driven by forces compatible with complete-specialization models. The driving 
factors of complete-specialization models are economies of scale and product differentiation. 
Hence, we may conclude that for the average European trade relationship, the traded final 
goods are differentiated products, as expected for trade relationships between similar 
countries. However, given the special relevance of incomplete-specialization models for East-
West trade across Europe, many of the final goods traded between Western and Eastern 
Europe are different products rather than differentiated products, and this is even more true 
for consumer than for capital goods. 
                                            
14 We perform the analysis also in terms of GDP per capita as relative supply-side country differences. The 
results are qualitatively the same. We do not report detailed results due to space, but they are readily available 
upon request. 
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Based on the highly disaggregated nature of our original trade data, we extend our 
analysis by decomposing trade in final goods along the two margins defined in section 4. The 
extensive margin denotes the number of exported goods and represents the variety of trade, 
while the intensive margin refers to the average volumes per exported good and represents the 
depth of trade. We report the results for trade in final goods in specifically marked columns 
in Tables 1 and 2 and also separately for capital goods (Table A.2) and consumer goods 
(Table A.3). First, coefficients associated with market size (β1) are about 50% larger for the 
intensive margin than for the extensive margin, no matter whether we look at final goods as a 
whole or decomposed. This finding reveals that trade in final goods across Europe is 
predominantly realized along the intensive margin with respect to the size of the economy. 
Second, when we inspect the sum of coefficient pairs β2 and γs, these are consistently larger 
along the extensive rather than the intensive margin. Accordingly, more final-goods trade for 
EU-15/EU-10 country pairs in response to relative supply-side country differences in wages 
is mostly realized along the extensive margin. Also, the effects on the two margins of trade 
depend on the type of final good. For capital goods, the intensive margin reactions negligibly 
increase over time while the extensive margin response becomes consistently larger for our 
first three sub-periods until 2001, but then decreases during 2002–2008 (Table A.2). In this 
sense, the results for capital goods are similar to those obtained for final goods as a whole 
(Tables 1 and 2). For consumer goods, the extensive margin reaction declines slowly over the 
whole period under research while the intensive margin response drops during first two 
periods and then remains at the same level (Table A.3). 
On the basis of the significance of Heckscher-Ohlin forces we analyze the trade 
margins of homogenous, rather than differentiated, products. Hence, our trade margin results 
may have a structural, quasi-Rybczynski explanation already noted in Romalis (2004), along 
the lines of Ventura (1997). If Eastern European countries were to repeat the experience of 
other previously rapidly growing small open economies, their capital accumulation would not 
simply induce more capital intensive production of the same goods, with a consequent 
reduction in marginal products. Rather, trade would enable them to shift production to 
capital-intensive industries without an effect on factor prices. Together with this, we should 
see a decline in the strength of the extensive margin responses to Heckscher-Ohlin forces that 
are based on these countries’ initially being capital-poorer than Western Europe, which is 
indeed what we observe. 
 
 24 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
In this study, we combine and extend the previous literature, especially Deardorff (1998), 
Evenett and Keller (2002), and Haveman and Hummels (2004). We develop a gravity 
specification that views bilateral gravity equations rooted in a Heckscher-Ohlin framework as 
statistical relationships constrained on countries’ multilateral specialization patterns. 
Heckscher-Ohlin multilateral specialization incentives are expressed by supply-side country 
differences relative to the rest of the world. On the basis of this specification, we argue that 
gravity equations augmented by ad hoc measures of supply-side country differences are mis-
specified, due to theoretically unmotivated attempts to allow for both complete- and 
incomplete-specialization influences on trade within the same gravity framework. We then 
apply our framework to analyze European trade in final goods. 
Our results show that trade in final goods between Western and Eastern Europe is 
driven by countries’ multilateral specialization incentives that are expressed by supply-side 
country differences relative to the rest of the world. In addition, more trade between new and 
old Europe in response to supply-side country differences is realized in an increased number 
of different products rather than more trade in established products. At the same time, for the 
majority of European trade relationships, negligibly small specialization coefficients indicate 
that specialization incentives do not play much of a role in final-good trade. Hence, European 
trade in final goods in our data on average appears as if driven by forces compatible with 
complete-specialization models. As the driving factors of complete-specialization models are 
economies of scale and product differentiation, we may conclude in a corollary that for the 
average European trade relationship, traded final goods are differentiated products, which is 
expected in trade relationships between similar countries. However, given the special 
relevance of incomplete specialization models for East-West trade across Europe, many of 
the final goods traded between Western and Eastern Europe are still different products rather 
than differentiated products, despite the gradual catching-up process of the new EU members.
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Table 1. Final goods estimation 
(w=wages as supply-side country differences; population weighted averages) 
 
Explanatory variables Trade Extensive Intensive 
Flows Margin Margin 
log Yj Yi 
  β1 0.769*** 0.320*** 0.448*** 
  (0.007) (0.003) (0.006) 
log (|wj – ww| × |wi – ww|) 
  β2 -0.096*** -0.069*** -0.028***   (0.011) (0.005) (0.010) 
  
1992-1995 γ1 0.164*** 0.130*** 0.034***   (0.007) (0.003) (0.006) 
  
1996-1998 γ2 0.169*** 0.136*** 0.033***   (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) 
log (|wj – ww| × |wi – ww|) 1999-2001 γ3 0.178*** 0.146*** 0.032*** for EU-15 and EU-10 pairs (0.006) (0.002) (0.005) 
  
2002-2004 γ4 0.161*** 0.135*** 0.025***   (0.006) (0.002) (0.005) 
  
2005-2008 γ5 0.135*** 0.105*** 0.030***   (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) 
Number of observations    23308 
 
Note: Table contains results for country-pair fixed effects estimation using dynamic panel technique (Arellano-
Bond-Bover-Blundel). Standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance 
on 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 2. Final goods estimation 
(w=GDP per capita supply-side country differences; population weighted averages) 
 
Explanatory variables Trade Extensive Intensive 
Flows Margin Margin 
log Yj Yi 
  β1 0.766*** 0.316*** 0.450*** 
  (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) 
log (|wj – ww| × |wi – ww|) 
  β2 -0.078*** -0.064*** -0.014   (0.011) (0.004) (0.010) 
  
1992-1995 γ1 0.127*** 0.103*** 0.024***   (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) 
  
1996-1998 γ2 0.131*** 0.110*** 0.021***   (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) 
log (|wj – ww| × |wi – ww|) 1999-2001 γ3 0.136*** 0.116*** 0.019*** for EU-15 and EU-10 pairs (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) 
  
2002-2004 γ4 0.121*** 0.109*** 0.012***   (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) 
  
2005-2008 γ5 0.098*** 0.087*** 0.012***   (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) 
Number of observations    27755 
 
Note: Table contains results for country-pair fixed effects estimation using dynamic panel technique (Arellano-
Bond-Bover-Blundel). Standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance 
on 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Figure 1. Comparison of confidence intervals for coefficients in specification (10) 
 
 
 
Note: Dark and blank bars refer to wages-based and GDP p.c.- based coefficients, respectively. 
Confidence intervals are labeled in the following way: GDP denotes the coefficient of the log Yj Yi (β1) and W 
denotes coefficient of the log (|wj – ww| × |wi – ww|) where w stands for wages (β2). Remaining confidence 
intervals refer to coefficients of the log (|wj – ww| × |wi – ww|) for the EU-15/10 dummy (γ1- γ5), computed over 
specified time periods; i.e. from 1992–1995 to 2005–2008. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A.1: Import-reporting countries and trade data availability 
 
1 Austria (1992–2008)   9 France (1992–2008) 17 Latvia (1995–2008)
2 Belgium and Luxembourg (1992–
2008) 
10 United Kingdom (1992–2008) 18 Netherlands (1992–2007) 
3 Bulgaria (1996–2008) 11 Germany (1992–2008) 19 Poland (1992–2008)
4 Czech Republic (1993–2008) 12 Greece (1992–2008) 20 Portugal (1992–2008)
5 Denmark (1992–2008) 13 Hungary (1992–2008) 21 Romania (1992–2008)
6 Spain (1992–2008) 14 Ireland (1992–2008) 22 Slovakia (1993–2008)
7 Estonia (1995–2008) 15 Italy (1992–2008) 23 Slovenia (1995–2008)
8 Finland (1992–2008) 16 Lithuania (1995–2008) 24 Sweden (1992–2008)
      
Notes: Belgium and Luxembourg are treated as one country. EU-15 countries are underlined, EU-10 are in italics. Each reporting country’s import data are given for all 
reporter countries for the indicated time period. Reporter countries plus Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Belarus, Canada, Switzerland, Cyprus, 
Georgia, Iceland, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Macedonia, Malta, Norway, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Turkey, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, the U.S., China, Hong 
Kong, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand (54 countries in all, on average accounting for above 90 per cent of reported imports) constitute the “world” for the 
computation of our world averages.
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Table A2. Capital goods estimation 
(w=wages supply-side country differences, population weighted averages) 
 
Explanatory variables Trade Extensive Intensive 
Flows Margin Margin 
log Yj Yi 
  β1 0.802*** 0.327*** 0.475*** 
  (0.008) (0.003) (0.008) 
log (|wj – ww| × |wi – ww|) 
  β2 -0.111*** -0.065*** -0.046***   (0.014) (0.005) (0.012) 
  
1992-1995 γ1 0.140*** 0.106*** 0.034***   (0.009) (0.003) (0.008) 
  
1996-1998 γ2 0.154*** 0.115*** 0.038***   (0.008) (0.003) (0.007) 
log (|wj – ww| × |wi – ww|) 1999-2001 γ3 0.176*** 0.128*** 0.048*** for EU-15 and EU-10 pairs (0.007) (0.003) (0.007) 
  
2002-2004 γ4 0.161*** 0.116*** 0.044***   (0.007) (0.003) (0.007) 
  
2005-2008 γ5 0.129*** 0.082*** 0.048***   (0.008) (0.003) (0.007) 
Number of observations    22914 
 
Note: Table contains results for country-pair fixed effects estimation using dynamic panel technique (Arellano-
Bond-Bover-Blundel). Standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance 
on 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table A3. Consumer goods estimation 
(w=wages supply-side country differences; population weighted averages) 
 
Explanatory variables Trade Extensive Intensive 
Flows Margin Margin 
log Yj Yi 
  β1 0.677*** 0.272*** 0.405*** 
  (0.007) (0.003) (0.006) 
log (|wj – ww| × |wi – ww|) 
  β2 -0.091*** -0.080*** -0.010   (0.011) (0.006) (0.010) 
  
1992-1995 γ1 0.250*** 0.169*** 0.081***   (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) 
  
1996-1998 γ2 0.242*** 0.167*** 0.075***   (0.007) (0.003) (0.006) 
log (|wj – ww| × |wi – ww|) 1999-2001 γ3 0.222*** 0.164*** 0.058*** for EU-15 and EU-10 pairs (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) 
  
2002-2004 γ4 0.201*** 0.151*** 0.051***   (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) 
  
2005-2008 γ5 0.186*** 0.129*** 0.056***   (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) 
Number of observations    22544 
 
Note: Table contains results for country-pair fixed effects estimation using dynamic panel technique (Arellano-
Bond-Bover-Blundel). Standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance 
on 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
 
DAVIDSON INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER SERIES - Most Recent Papers 
The entire Working Paper Series may be downloaded free of charge at: www.wdi.umich.edu 
 
CURRENT AS OF   09/10/13 
 
 
Publication Authors Date 
No. 1054: Specialization, gravity, and European trade in final goods Richard Frensch, Jan Hanousek 
and Evzen Kocenda 
July 2013 
No. 1053: Public Debt Sustainability in Africa: Building Resilience and 
Challenges Ahead 
Zuzana Brixiova and  
Mthuli Ncube 
July 2013 
No. 1052: YOUTH EMPLOYMENT IN AFRICA: NEW EVIDENCE AND POLICIES 
FROM SWAZILAND 
Zuzana Brixiova and Thierry 
Kangoye 
June 2013 
No. 1051: Oil Windfalls, Fiscal Policy and Money Market Disequilibrium Salman Huseynov, Vugar 
Ahmadov 
June 2013 
No. 1050: Price Jump Indicators: Stock Market Empirics During the Crisis Jan Novotný, Jan Hanousek, and 
Evžen Kočenda 
June 2013 
No. 1049: Impact of Financial Deregulation on Monetary & Economic 
Policy in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland: 1990-2003 
Patricia McGrath May 2013 
No. 1048: The 90% Public Debt Threshold: The Rise & Fall of a Stylised 
Fact. 
Balázs Égert May 2013 
No. 1047: The efficiency and equity of the tax and transfer system in 
France 
Balázs Égert April 2013 
No. 1046: Optimal Resource Rent Rustam Jamilov Mar 2013 
No. 1045: Financial Development and Economic Growth:  
A Meta-Analysis 
Petra Valickova, Tomas Havranek 
and Roman Horvath 
Mar 2013 
No. 1044: Incomplete Specialization & Trade in Parts & Components Richard Frensch, Jan Hanousek & 
Evzen Kocenda 
Mar 2013 
No. 1043: Tax evasion, tax corruption and stochastic 
growth 
Fred Célimène, Gilles Dufrénot,  
Gisèle Mophou, and Gaston 
N.Guérékata 
Feb 2013 
No. 1042: Public debt, economic growth and nonlinear effects: Myth or 
reality? 
Balázs Égert Feb 2013 
No. 1041: Interest Rate Pass-Through and Monetary Policy Asymmetry: 
A Journey into the Caucasian Black Box 
Rustam Jamilov and 
Balázs Égert 
Feb 2013 
No. 1040: Myths about Beta-Convergence Konstantin Gluschenko 
 
Nov 2012 
No. 1039: South East Asian Monetary Integration: New Evidences from 
Fractional Cointegration of Real Exchange Rates 
Gilles de Truchis and  
Benjamin Keddad 
Oct 2012 
No. 1038: Transmission Lags of Monetary Policy: A Meta-Analysis Tomas Havranek &  
Marek Rusnak 
Oct 2012 
No. 1037: The Dynamics of the Regulation of Labor in Developing and 
Developed Countries since 1960 
Nauro Campos and 
Jeffrey Nugent 
Sept 2012 
No. 1036: Sovereign Wealth Fund Issues and The National Fund(s) of 
Kazakhstan 
David Kemme August 
2012 
No. 1035: Stock Market Comovements in Central Europe: Evidence from 
Asymmetric DCC Model 
Dritan Gjika and Roman Horvath August 
2012 
No. 1034: Regional Motives for Post-Entry Subsidiary Development:  
The Case of Poland 
Agnieszka Chidlow, Christine 
Holmstrom-Lind, Ulf Holm & 
Heinz Tuselmann 
June 2012 
 
